Ok... so, this is not very far into the book. I've gotten stumped quickly. He's been enquiring into the nature of the good - which is that which we desire for its own sake, in this life, as opposed to something that we desire for the sake of something else. This is at 1.441 (1), and he's attempting to dismiss the idea that the good is an Idea or Form.
In 1.441 the title is Objections to the Form as a Universal (is this Aristotle's title?).
(1) There are no universals for ordered series.
Those who introduced this view did not mean to produce an Idea for any [series] in which they spoke of prior and posterior [members]; that was why they did not mean to establish an Idea [of number] for [the series of] numbres.
Now, I take this to be setting up his argument. Things that are series don't have Forms - it is a collection of forms, and is a composite. The reason that people would argue this (at this point in time) is that simplicity is an essential element of what makes a Form a Form.
Ok, so it looks like what he's going to argue is that there's a category of things that cannot include Forms, and that the good is part of this category, and is therefore a Form. Let's see where he goes from here:
But the good is spoken of both in the [category of] what-it-is [i.e. substance], and in [the categories of] quality and relative
Now, it seems to me that at this point I'm misunderstanding something. Probably, he is not seeing the problem in the terms that I was predicting. He seems to be seeing the problem in terms of substance and relation. But, what does he mean when he says that the good is both a substance and a relation?
It seems to me that when we speak of something as a what-it-is, we're referring it to as a subject. This sentence: "the good is the end of an activity" seems to refer to the good as a substance. But, sometimes, he points out that we use "good" as an adjective. This is a good pie - it's more excellent than other pies. This is a relation, because it's comparing two pies - good pies and bad pies.
Let's continue on and see if this analysis bears out:
and what is is in itself, i.e. substance, is by nature prior to what is relative, since a relative would seem to be an appendage and coincdient of being. And so there is no common Idea over these.
What exactly is happening here? Is the first half of this quote saying that the good, but virtue of being a quality and relative, is sometimes prior to something else? And that would make it a series, of which there is no Idea.
That would follow, but I'm not sure that the relation of substance and relative is the same kind of relation that obtains between numbers in a series. I guess the way to find out if this is true might be an analysis of what a series is, but lunch is only so long.
This has been a helpful blog post for me. If you've got any ideas that I'm missing, you can go ahead and leave them here.
13 comments:
Bah. I tried understanding the sections of Aristotle that you posted and failed. So I went to see if I could find an “NIV” translation. I think I succeeded and I can make more sense out of it now. Oh, and this is long, but you ASKED for it.
Said translation is located at:
http://www.ilt.columbia.edu/publicAtions/Projects/digitexts/aristotle/nicomachean_ethics/book01.html
It’s by WD Ross, no slouch of an early 20th century ethicist, though as for his translation skills I have no idea.
I think I found the section you are referring to in Book I chapter 6 - I don't know what Irwin is using in your translation for text divisions, but I've had problems x-referencing it with other texts unless I use book/chapter divisions.
Interpretive Q: Can we assume that the Platonists that he is talking about hold the same view as their master? That might be important. If we try and shoehorn this explication into something that resembles what Plato said when that wasn’t what Aristotle was thinking of, we haven’t understood him.
I’ll try to assume that Aristotle was speaking of something like a Platonist “participation” realism.
Aristotle claims first that there are two ways of speaking about “goods” on Platonism. On one hand there are things that are loved for themselves. On the other hand, there are “goods” that produce the first kind of good, preserve it, and prevent their contraries. These are “goods” in a secondary or derivative sort of way.
What does this mean?
Is it that there is a “good” that is abstract from physical reality and that whatever brings about participation in it, preserves that relation, and prevents the contrary property from being is “good” in some derivative way?
I was thinking about this and can see some other ways the interpretation could go, but this seems the most plausible.
Aristotle distinguishes between the two, calling the former "good" and the latter "useful".
He then asks the question of the “good”, “Are the things that are called “good” called so by reference to a single Idea (Form)?” (paraphrased) His answer: no.
Lemma 1: We value some things that are good without being good for the sake of something else. Among these are intelligence, sight, and certain pleasures. If there is a form of the good, then it is empty. (why?)
Lemma 2: These valued items from above all participate in the form of the Good. The case is analogous to whiteness in snow and whiteness in lead. There is a common feature between them that is unmistakable. But no such common feature exists between these "goods-in-themselves", so there is no form of the Good.
So, if I've got this right, either the Platonist has a frustrating choice, between having a form that is real but empty, or having no form at all, based on the argument by analogy with clear cases of objects participating in forms (whiteness).
But what about emptiness? What does this mean? I'm not absolutely sure. Maybe he means something like this: "If these things aren't good in themselves, then the Form of the Good might exist, but it doesn't have anything to do with the things that we call good." But there might be other ways of characterizing it.
As I've said, I don't know that this is actually Plato's view that he's dealing with, so it might be that I'm wedging a square peg into a round hole.
Further still – it would probably be helpful to look at Aristotle’s similar arguments in the Metaphysics, which I understand go into much more detail in his quibbles with the Forms. Reading that might elucidate whatever is going on here.
I can think of some Platonic rejoinders to this argument as it is stated, but I'll spare you hearing them from me, since I've already written a huge comment.
-bill
This is interesting because the link you posted does not use the subtitles of the book Torrey assigns. Terence Irwin divides the chapters (it was chapter 6) into subchapters, by what he thinks are separate arguments.
So, basically, everywhere that WD Ross puts "further" is, for Irwin, a new argument, which he translates the text to fit. I was reading the first argument (the beginning of the second paragraph in 1.6) closely. I think that your argument is more inclusive of the general thrust of 1.6, which I haven't spent much time on, yet. I'll look at that tomorrow. At the moment, I suspect Irwin's right - Aristotle is hitting us with a group of arguments designed to tear down somebody's view of the Forms.
And by "chapter 6" I mean "chapter 1, subchapter 6."
Or, rather, Book 1, chapter 6.
I haven't checked the link Bill posted, since I don't have time to read something long right now.
However, if Bill represented the link text correctly it seems like it describes a different argument than the one Jon pointed out.
Jon's argument:
1. No overarching idea for a series.
2. Describing Good as something in itself, and also a relation, signifies a series.
3. Therefore, there is no overarching idea of Good.
Bill's argument:
Lemma 1. The "form of the Good" could signify the ultimate thing we want for itself, for which all other things are desired. However, there are multiple things we want for themselves. Therefore, there is no ultimate thing for which all other things are desired. Thus, "the form of the Good" refers to nothing, i.e. is empty.
Lemma 2. The "form of the Good" could signify the common feature of all things we want for themselves. However, there is no common feature among these things. Therefore, etc.
I don't see the similarity between Jon's and Bill's arguments.
Bleah, bad grammar. Wish there was an edit button for comments.
Eric - you need to read the arguments side by side. I've provided a link and the chapter number, for heaven's sake. They are translations of the same thing.
Jonathan - You say "At the moment, I suspect Irwin's right - Aristotle is hitting us with a group of arguments designed to tear down somebody's view of the Forms." I'm confused. Do you take Ross' translation to indicate that Aristotle is doing otherwise?
Bill
Sorry, that was rude of me to interject like that, and I missed the flow of what is going on between you two. Now that I've read all the applicable material I think I get it. Bill's describing what he considers to be the overall thrust of the section that Jon just posted a portion of, not analyzing the same argument Jon posted.
Also, my representation of Lemma 1 in incorrect.
Bill - On my read, I agree with your description of what 'empty' means. Aristotle seems practically minded here and only considers 'good' to be worth discussing if it can be achieved.
I would be interested in seeing what the Platonic responses to the two arguments are.
Jonathan - I agree that Aristotle is listing a group of arguments, each countering a common argument one would hear from a Platonist.
Mea Culpa, Eric, you were right. I got the wrong argument - due to some similarities in structure. I've gone through Ross' text and tried to make sense of the argument and think that I have a plausible and valid rendition of the argument, though in my form, it's not tantamount to rejection of the forms.
Quotes in bold - from text linked above:
The men who introduced this doctrine [Forms] did not posit Ideas of classes within which they recognized priority and posteriority (which is the reason why they did not maintain the existence of an Idea embracing all numbers);
Out of any context as to what the late platonists were saying, this is pretty hard to nail down. What Aristotle means by the refusal to "posit Ideas of classes" with priority and posteriority and what the parenthetical bit about numbers is, is pretty osbcure without having read whoever he's thinking of. Does he mean a single idea for the series of numbers, or a single idea for number in general – or something entirely apart? I've got nothing here. I'm baffled.
but the term 'good' is used both in the category of substance and in that of quality and in that of relation,
So, now he's got a distinction between different things called "good."
and that which is per se, i.e. substance, is prior in nature to the relative (for the latter is like an off shoot and accident of being);
Sounds like he means that there is a dependence relation between substances and their properties. This is intuitive.
so that there could not be a common Idea set over all these goods
This is the conclusion. It's clear what he thinks, but unclear how he gets there.
Here's my attempt to make sense of the argument:
1) The Platonists say that the forms do not exist in classes with orders of priority.
2) "Good" is a form.
3) "Good" comes in qualities, relations, and substances.
from 2&3: 4) A form comes in qualities, relations, and substances.
5) Relations are dependent on substances.
6) (supressed premise) If any x is dependent on any y, then y is prior to x.
modus ponens of 6 & 5 7) Substances are prior to relations
from 7 & 4 8) Some forms are prior to other forms
8) ~1)
From 8 & ??? : 9) There is no common idea over all things called "good".
I got all the way to 8 without problems, but I have no idea what gets him to 9) and I think that it has to be the conviction that somehow 1) is essential to the Platonism. Perhaps someone knows more about Platonism than I do and can make sense out of how this would work.
Further, I have suspicions that some of the premises are "cooked". For instance - the Platonist might just say - well, we use "good" for qualities, relations, and substances, but we don't use them in the same way, so premise 3) might be troublesome for Aristotle. But I think that everything is hamstrung by the fact that we only have Aristotle speaking and not the Platonists too.
I'm going to alert Issler to this thread. He's studying Plato right now, maybe he can enlighten us.
First, on a practical note (to Jonathan): you can poke around in the Metaphysics if you're really interested in Aristotle's ontological views, but if you're primarily interested in a discussion of ethics I wouldn't get too hung up on this particular passage. Aristotle's objective is just to reject a universal Form of Good as a proper ground for an ethical system; this rejection helps to provide support for the approach he does take, viz. an examination of the characteristics of particular goods, from which he will ultimately derive his ethical theory.
On to the blather:
The different arguments as offered present large hermeneutical difficulties, and since they generally fall into two mutually contradictory categories (i.e. A. there can be no universal Form of Good, and B. the Form of Good is not a worthwhile object of study) I'm not sure how Aristotle originally intended them. As to a possible Platonic (or Platonist) response, you'd first have to do some digging into contemporary Academic theories of forms as well as some fleshing out of Aristotle's own arguments, in order to figure out what he's really saying and with which position he's arguing. (Also, Aristotle and the Academics are using different ontological categories, which further adds to the mix.)
Dang, this interesting thread seems to have died. That's too bad.
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